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DIVINE KNOWLEDGE AND  
QUALITATIVE INDISCERNIBILITY
Daniel S. Murphy
This paper is about the nature of God’s pre-creation knowledge of possible 
creatures. I distinguish three theories: non-qualitative singularism, qualita-
tive singularism, and qualitative generalism, which differ in terms of whether 
the relevant knowledge is qualitative or non-qualitative, and whether God has 
singular or merely general knowledge of creatures. My main aim is to argue 
that qualitative singularism does not depend on a version of the Principle of 
Identity of Indiscernibles to the effect that, necessarily, qualitatively indis-
cernible individuals are identical. It follows that qualitative singularism does 
not depend on the view that possible creatures categorically have qualitative 
individual essences.
1. Introduction
This paper is about the nature of God’s pre-creation knowledge of 
possible creatures. By “possible creatures,” I have in mind non-divine in-
dividuals (such as persons, pieces of matter, etc.). By God’s “pre-creation” 
knowledge, I mean the knowledge God has prior to creating any such 
individuals. If God has a temporal mode of existence, the word “prior” 
can be taken in a straightforward temporal sense, and I assume there was 
a time at which there were no creatures and never had been any. If God 
has an atemporal mode of existence, “prior” can be taken in some sort 
of logical or metaphysical sense. Inasmuch as God timelessly acts on the 
basis of some sort of knowledge of what he might timelessly do, we can 
ask about the nature of that knowledge. I assume a robust conception of 
creation, on which God’s creating something involves bringing about its 
existence (or being, etc.), as opposed to merely conferring some property, 
such as “actuality,” on an antecedently existing (or real, etc.) thing. I also 
assume that something must exist if it is to stand in a relation. So, God’s 
pre-creation knowledge of a creature cannot consist in the holding of any 
cognitive relation between God and that individual. For were God to bear, 
prior to creation, such a relation to that individual, he would know, prior 
to creation, that it exists (or will exist, or “will” exist), in which case he 
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would not be in a position to decide whether to create it.1 So what, then, 
does the relevant knowledge consist in?
This is my topic. My main aim is to defend a theory of pre-creation 
knowledge on which such knowledge is both qualitative and singular. This 
kind of theory, which I will call qualitative singularism, has been advanced 
before,2 but attached to metaphysical views that many find implausible. I 
will argue that qualitative singularism can be severed from these attach-
ments. Specifically, I will argue that it does not depend on a qualitative 
version of the “Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles” to the effect that, 
necessarily, individuals with identical qualitative properties are numeri-
cally identical. It follows that qualitative singularism does not imply that 
possible creatures categorically have qualitative “individual essences.” If 
I am right, the prospects for qualitative singularism are enhanced, since 
there is good reason to reject the relevant version of the identity of indis-
cernibles. And it would be good for qualitative singularism’s prospects to 
be enhanced, for alternative theories face problems—or so I will suggest, 
without pretending to refute them.
2. Preliminaries
Suppose God creates a piece of matter, Matt. What is the nature of God’s 
pre-creation knowledge of Matt? Though it cannot consist in God’s bearing 
any relation to Matt, it could consist in his bearing a relation to some sort 
of proxy, p, for Matt. The idea would be that p, unlike Matt, exists prior to 
creation, and is such that God’s bearing a particular relation to it intui-
tively constitutes knowledge of Matt. It is not clear that this sort of account 
of God’s pre-creation knowledge of something, on which such knowledge 
consists in his bearing a relation to a proxy or “stand-in” for it, is the only 
sort that might be developed. However, it has precedent,3 and I find it con-
genial for my purposes in this paper. What might be a proxy for Matt? An 
initially natural thought is that such a proxy will be an individual essence 
of Matt (hereafter I may elide the word “individual”), by which I mean a 
property the having of which is necessary and sufficient for being Matt.
With this proxy account of divine knowledge in hand, I now want to 
draw two distinctions between kinds of theories.
1There are complications here due to possible views about God’s relation to time, the na-
ture of the time to which he is related, the relation between relations and time (e.g., whether 
a relation’s relata need exist at the same time), and whether there can be facts “prior to” God’s 
knowing them. Our assumed conception of creation implies that no creature exists-prior-to-
creation, i.e., is “located there.” However, one might think this is consistent with its being the 
case, prior to creation, that a creature exists (by virtue of being located at a later time), or will 
exist, or “will” (in an irreducibly metaphysical sense) exist. Thanks to a referee for getting me 
to sharpen the text’s argument, which is designed to accommodate all the relevant subtleties.
2For example, by Leibniz (see Adams, “Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity,” 9–13) 
and, more recently, Linda Zagzebski (“Individual Essence and the Creation”).
3This sort of account was employed by Aquinas and others (see Zagzebski, “Individual 
Essence and the Creation,” 135–136, 142–143; and Menzel, “Temporal Actualism and Singular 
Foreknowledge,” 479–487), and for more recent executions, see, in addition to Zagzebski and 
Menzel themselves, e.g., Kvanvig, The Possibility of an All-Knowing God, 122.
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There is an intuitive distinction between qualitative and non-qualitative 
properties, relations, and propositions (or facts, or states of affairs). Let 
us call anything that is a property, relation, or proposition a matter. It is 
commonly said that non-qualitative matters “involve” or are “about” 
particular concrete particulars in some sort of direct way. This gloss sug-
gests that non-qualitative matters include, for example, the property of 
being Obama, the relation of sitting next to Biden earlier than, and the 
proposition that Obama and Biden are five feet apart; and that qualitative 
matters include, for example, the property of being blue, the proposition 
that there are two individuals that are five feet apart, and the proposition 
that sphericity is instantiated.4
However, I think directly involving a particular concrete particular 
is merely sufficient for a matter’s being non-qualitative. Consider the 
property of being Matt, or of being identical to Matt. Call this an identity 
property.5 Identity properties for individuals are non-qualitative. Now let 
us say that a haecceity would, were there such things, be a primitive prop-
erty the having of which determines the possessor’s being the very entity 
it is.6 If Matt has a haecceity, it would not be its identity property, but 
something the having of which explains its having its identity property. I 
think haecceities for individuals would be non-qualitative (one may even 
be tempted to use the word “non-qualitative” in explicating them), but it 
is not clear that they directly involve particular individuals.
We may not need informative necessary and sufficient conditions for 
a matter’s being qualitative or non-qualitative. For one thing, we might 
take the distinction to be primitive.7 Perhaps we can go some way toward 
better elucidating it by invoking the idea of universality or generality.8 
Intuitively, the reason a haecceity for an individual would fail to be quali-
tative is that it would be both (a) equivalent with the identity property 
of an individual and (b) primitive, i.e., such that its instantiation would 
not consist in anything further. Relatively simple qualitative properties 
like being blue or being five feet away from something are multiply-exem-
plifiable, and hence fail to satisfy (a). And while a qualitative essence of 
an individual would satisfy (a), it would presumably fail to satisfy (b), 
4The words “qualitative” and “non-qualitative” are not always used to get at the dis-
tinction I am after. For example, Katherine Hawley extends “non-qualitative” to matters 
involving the identity and parthood relations (“Identity and Indiscernibility,” 102). On this 
use, not only is the proposition that Obama and Biden are five feet apart “non-qualitative,” 
but the proposition that there are two individuals that are five feet apart is too. Alternatively, 
one might use “qualitative” as an adjectival form of “quality” (see Paul, “Building the World 
From Its Fundamental Constituents.”). On this use, a trope would be a “qualitative” entity, 
whereas on mine, no particular is qualitative or non-qualitative.
5Robert Adams calls identity properties of individuals “thisnesses” (see, e.g., his “Primi-
tive Thisness and Primitive Identity,” 6).
6Cf., e.g., Adams, “Actualism and Thisness,” 12–18; Cover and O’Leary-Hawthorne, Sub-
stance and Individuation in Leibniz, 278; and Lowe, “Individuation,” 86–89.
7Adams, “Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity,” 9.
8Ibid., 7–8.
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since it would presumably be a rather complex property the instantiation 
of which consists in the instantiation of simpler, multiply-exemplifiable 
qualitative features. But by virtue of a haecceity’s satisfying (a) and (b), 
there seems to be no generality or universality about it, even if it would 
not directly involve any individuals per se. For present purposes, however, 
it should suffice to say that any matter that directly involves a particular 
concrete particular or a haecceity for one, or that is such a haecceity, is 
non-qualitative.
We can apply the qualitative / non-qualitative distinction to theories of 
pre-creation divine knowledge in the following way. On the qualitative 
theory, such knowledge is categorically qualitative, in the sense that the 
proxies with which God is acquainted are categorically qualitative mat-
ters. For example, one might think God is acquainted with qualitative 
essences of creatures. On the non-qualitative theory, the relevant knowledge 
is at least partly non-qualitative, in the sense that at least some proxies are 
non-qualitative. For example, one might think God is acquainted with non-
qualitative essences of creatures, such as identity properties or haecceities.
The second distinction I want to focus on is that between singularist and 
generalist theories of pre-creation knowledge.9 On the singularist theory, 
the relevant knowledge is categorically singular, whereas on the gener-
alist theory, it is at least partly merely general (hereafter I will elide the 
word “merely”). Consider Matt again. As a first pass, we might say that 
the difference between God’s having singular knowledge and his having 
general knowledge of Matt turns on whether the knowledge that consti-
tutes knowledge of Matt conflates Matt with another possible creature. If it 
does, it is general, and it is singular otherwise. And an initially intuitive 
way to make sense of whether the knowledge conflates Matt with another 
possible creature is in terms of whether Matt and any other possible crea-
ture share a proxy. If so, God’s pre-creation knowledge conflates Matt with 
another possible creature, resulting in general knowledge of Matt.10
Though I take the singularist / generalist distinction and the qualita-
tive / non-qualitative distinction to be orthogonal, I see no reason to adopt 
9See Menzel, “Temporal Actualism and Singular Foreknowledge.”
10Strictly speaking, there are no merely possible creatures to have proxies. Suppose we take 
proxies to be properties possibly had by that for which they proxy. If P proxies for Matt, we 
may make sense of the sentence “Matt and a merely possible creature share P as a proxy” 
in terms of the claim that P is both possibly such that Matt has it and possibly such that 
something x that is not Matt has it. If P is like this, acquaintance with P constitutes general 
knowledge of Matt. But if P is necessarily such that anything that has it is Matt, acquaintance 
with P constitutes singular knowledge of Matt. Since Matt exists, we can now talk about 
God’s having had, prior to creation, knowledge of Matt. But it may be more faithful to the 
pre-creation state of things to say that, prior to creation, acquaintance with P constitutes sin-
gular or general knowledge of a possible creature (or creatures). We may make sense of “prior 
to creation, two possible creatures share P as a proxy” in terms of the claim that, prior to 
creation, P is possibly such that something x both has P and is possibly such that something y 
that is not x has P. If P is like this, acquaintance with P constitutes general knowledge of some 
possible creatures. But if P is possibly such that something x both has P and is necessarily 
such that anything y that has P is x, acquaintance with P constitutes singular knowledge of 
a possible creature.
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non-qualitative generalism. For if non-qualitative knowledge of possible 
creatures is granted, there seems to be no barrier to singular knowledge. 
So I see the main contenders as non-qualitative singularism, qualitative 
singularism, and qualitative generalism. Though I will say a bit about 
why one might be unsatisfied with the first and third, my main aim is to 
defend the second from an objection.
Although I find the topic of this paper of intrinsic philosophical interest, 
let me say a bit about why it matters. First, I have argued elsewhere that 
Molinism depends on singularism.11 The basic idea, very roughly, is that 
there could not be true subjunctive conditionals of creaturely freedom (in 
a libertarian sense) for types of possible creatures, but only for particular, 
token ones. So, if God is to grasp true conditionals of the relevant kind 
prior to creation, he must have singular knowledge of possible creatures 
prior to creation. Second, one might think generalism threatens the in-
tegrity of some divine attributes, such as God’s knowledge and power. 
Prima facie, it seems that generalism implies that, prior to creation, the 
domain of what is possible outstrips, in some sense, the domain of what 
is divinely conceived, or apprehended, or entertained, etc. As such, it 
looks as if, prior to creation, there are some possibilities of which God 
is ignorant and incapable of intentionally actualizing.12 Third, the topic 
of pre-creation divine knowledge of individuals is intimately connected 
with metaphysical issues concerning both the natures of individuals 
themselves and the ontological grounds of modal facts about them.13 As 
such, theists interested in these metaphysical issues may find the present 
topic particularly interesting.
Here is the plan for what follows. In §3, I will say a bit about why one 
might find the non-qualitative theory unsatisfactory. In §4, I will raise a 
challenge for qualitative singularism concerning the apparent falsity of a 
particular version of the identity of indiscernibles, and explain how this 
might seem to motivate qualitative generalism. In §5 and §6, I will argue 
that qualitative singularism is in fact consistent with the relevant prin-
ciple’s falsity. I will wrap up in §7.
3. Against the Non-qualitative Theory
One reason to prefer the qualitative theory is that it is easier to see how the 
relevant proxies could exist prior to creation.14
Let us consider a version of the non-qualitative theory on which the 
proxies are identity properties of creatures. An identity property directly 
11Murphy, “Molinism, Creature-types, and the Nature of Counterfactual Implication.”
12Christopher Menzel defends generalism from this kind of objection (see “Temporal Ac-
tualism and Singular Foreknowledge,” 498–502).
13I borrow the phrase “ontological grounds” from a referee.
14Some work on this issue with which I will not directly interact includes Zagzebski, 
“Individual Essence and the Creation,” 135–143; Menzel, “Temporal Actualism and Singular 
Foreknowledge,” 489–491; Plantinga, “On Existentialism”; and the exchange between Kit 
Fine and Alvin Plantinga in Alvin Plantinga.
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involves the entity that would have it, were it instantiated. What I will 
say about this view, however, can be applied to any version of the non-
qualitative theory on which the proxies directly involve creatures. (For 
example, consider the property of being the product of sperm s and egg 
e, or the proposition that Obama exists.) This view constitutes a version 
of non-qualitative singularism on which there is a one-to-one correspon-
dence between proxies and creatures: every creature has just one proxy, 
and (more saliently) no creatures share a proxy.
Being Matt → Matt
Being Obama → Obama
Being Biden → Biden
Let us consider Matt’s identity property, i.e., being Matt. What is the na-
ture of this property? Let us first suppose that the existence of being Matt 
partly consists in the existence of Matt itself. One way to develop this is to 
suppose that being Matt has Matt as a constituent. For example, perhaps 
the property is somehow built out of the identity relation and Matt. Or 
perhaps the property is to be understood as the set of its instances, i.e., 
{Matt}. Alternatively, perhaps the existence of being Matt partly consists in 
that of Matt for reasons unrelated to the property’s ontological structure. 
For example, Robert Adams maintains that an identity property depends 
for its existence on that of its possessor, because what it is to be the identity 
property of a given entity is to stand in a particular relation with that entity 
(requiring that it exist).15 So take being Matt. This has the property of being 
the identity property of Matt, and this looks like an essential property of it. 
Further, it seems that having the property of being the identity property of 
Matt consists in bearing a relation to Matt, requiring that Matt exist. So, it 
seems that the existence of being Matt partly consists in that of Matt.
Now if the existence of being Matt partly consists in that of Matt, it fails 
to constitute a viable proxy for Matt. For prior to creation, the matter itself 
does not exist, from which it seems to follow that, prior to creation, the 
property does not.16
Let us now suppose that the existence of being Matt does not partly con-
sist in that of Matt. As I construed Adams’s argument for the conclusion 
that an identity property depends for its existence on that of its possessor, 
there were two premises:
15Adams, “Actualism and Thisness,” 11.
16One might challenge this inference on the basis of the thought that Matt’s post-creation 
existence suffices for being Matt’s pre-creation existence. (Cf. Kvanvig, “Adams on Actualism 
and Presentism.”) But this would not render the property a viable proxy. For the proxy must 
not only exist, but also be grasped by God, prior to creation. But if the proxy’s pre-creation 
existence were underpinned by Matt’s post-creation existence, it would not be grasped prior 
to creation. For if God grasped it prior to creation, he would be aware, prior to creation, of its 
dependence on Matt’s post-creation existence, in which case he would not be in a position to 
decide whether Matt is to exist.
Alef
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(1) Being Matt has being the identity property of Matt essentially.
(2) Having being the identity property of Matt consists in bearing a rela-
tion to Matt.
However, one might deny (1) by maintaining that all that is essential to 
being Matt is that it is the identity property of Matt if anything—or in other 
words, if it is possessed at all.17
Now if the existence of being Matt does not partly consist in that of 
Matt, being Matt would seem to constitute a viable proxy in this sense: 
were there such a thing, it would exist prior to creation. However, now 
it is by no means clear that there is any such property. If Matt is put in 
front of me, I am initially sanguine with countenancing the existence of a 
property perspicuously expressed by the phrase “being Matt.” But I think 
this is because I am initially inclined to take the existence of the relevant 
property to partly consist in that of the individual that it involves and that 
is ostensibly before me. This kind of perspective generalizes and may be 
naturally taken to underlie the kind of casual talk about non-qualitative 
properties and relations (exhibited in §2) in which it is taken for granted 
that there are such things. They can be taken for granted, it seems to me, 
because of their constitutive connection with the individuals they involve 
and that are taken for granted. Now perhaps there are, in addition to non-
qualitative features of this sort, non-qualitative features of another sort 
that—we may suppose—can also be picked out with the same kinds of 
names (e.g., the phrase “being Matt,” “sitting next to Biden earlier than,” 
etc.) and whose existence does not partly consist in that of the individuals 
they involve. But we have yet to see reason to think so.
If the existence of being Matt would not partly consist in that of Matt, 
we might think we are talking about a haecceity (see §2). Matt’s haecceity 
would be equivalent with being Matt, and, like being Matt on the current 
conception, would not be essentially had by Matt, but only essentially had 
by Matt if anything. Further, being Matt would, on the current conception, 
be a primitive property, for were its instantiation to consist in something 
further, that would presumably be the proxy. To be sure, I introduced 
haecceities as distinct from identity properties, but the distinction may 
collapse on certain conceptions of the latter’s nature. After arguing that 
identity properties depend for their existence on that of their possessors, 
Adams acknowledges that one might resist his argument by construing 
identity properties as haecceities, the non-existence for which he has sepa-
rate arguments.18
It is not my intention here to argue against the existence of haecceities, 
or—if one wants to distinguish them—of primitive “identity properties” 
whose existence would be independent from that of their possessors. My 
aim has been, not to refute the non-qualitative theory, but to highlight a 
17Plantinga, “On Existentialism,” 5.
18Adams, “Actualism and Thisness,” 12–18. See also e.g., Lowe, “Individuation,” 88.
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consideration that can be raised against it, the power of which may vary 
depending on one’s own metaphysical leanings. The problem, as I see it, 
is this: the theory needs proxies that would, were they to exist at all, exist 
prior to creation; and yet, for any candidate conception of the proxies, 
the plausibility that they would be like this is inversely proportional to 
the plausibility that they exist at all. If the candidate proxies’ existence is 
bound up with that of (non-divine) individuals themselves, then while 
there plausibly are such things, they are not around prior to creation. On 
the other hand, if the candidate proxies have an existence independent 
of that of individuals themselves, then (to repeat my leanings) it is un-
clear that there are such things.19 And of course, it would be illegitimate 
to equivocate here, relying on one conception of the proxies in motivating 
their general existence and switching to another in motivating their pre-
creation availability—or alternatively, to rely on a vague conception that 
inhibits an adequate examination of the general existence question or the 
pre-creation availability question in the first place.
4. The Qualitative Theory and Qualitative Indiscernibility
Insofar as one finds the pre-creation existence of non-qualitative essences 
of creatures problematic, it may be natural to consider a theory of pre-
creation divine knowledge on which God is acquainted with qualitative 
essences. For example, suppose there are two qualitative properties, being 
F and being G, each of which is essential to Matt, and the conjunction of 
which is sufficient for being Matt. Acquaintance with such an essence, 
namely being F and G, would intuitively constitute singular knowledge of 
Matt. Generalizing to other possible creatures, we get qualitative singula-
rism. If we assume that anything that has a qualitative essence has just one, 
we get a version on which there is a one-to-one correspondence between 
proxies and creatures. (Alternatively, we might grant that something has 
multiple qualitative essences, but select one as its proxy.) On this view, we 
can take the instantiation of a creature’s identity property to consist in that 
of its qualitative essence, and simply reject the existence of haecceities.
Now a powerful and well-known problem confronts this view. The 
view that possible creatures categorically have qualitative essences im-
plies the following version of the so-called “Principle of the Identity of 
Indiscernibles”:
(PII) Necessarily, for any individuals x and y, if x and y have identical 
qualitative properties, then x and y are identical.
19See Rosenkrantz, Haecceity, for a defense of the existence of haecceities. Ironically (in 
the present context), however, Rosenkrantz denies that God could grasp them (220–224). Cf. 
Cover and O’Leary-Hawthorne, Substance and Individuation in Leibniz, 278. Propositions might 
be invoked as proxies instead of properties, and what I have said in this section about non-
qualitative properties could be extended to non-qualitative propositions. See Plantinga, “On 
Existentialism,” for a defense of the view that non-qualitative propositions have an existence 
independent of that of the individuals they involve; and for recent work on this issue, see 
e.g., Speaks, “On Possibly Nonexistent Propositions.”
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And the problem is that PII is very likely false, or so many philosophers 
think.
The following kind of situation can exhibit why PII seems false and 
why it is implied by the idea that possible creatures categorically have 
qualitative essences.20 Consider a world (i.e., a maximal way for reality 
to be) in which two iron spheres come to exist ex nihilo at some spatial 
distance from each other, persist unchanged for five seconds, and then 
wink out of existence. Suppose they have identical qualitative properties, 
intrinsic and extrinsic. For example, both are iron, spherical, a particular 
distance from something iron and spherical, etc. This qualitative identity 
can be intuitively grasped in terms of the spheres’ being divided by an 
axis of spatial symmetry, such that each is a “mirror image” of the other. 
Let the word “Alef” denote such a world, and “Castor” and “Pollux” its 
two spheres.
Alef
C P
Castor and Pollux satisfy, in Alef, the antecedent but not the consequent 
in PII. So, if Alef is a possible world (i.e., possible maximal way for reality 
to be), PII is false. Now, there admittedly are ways of trying to save PII 
from apparent counterexamples like Alef,21 and it is not my intention to 
establish its falsity. My main interest in PII is to argue that qualitative sin-
gularism does not depend on it, and PII’s controversial status is enough to 
render this significant. So I will assume that Alef is possible and PII false.
To see how PII’s falsity precludes the categorical possession of qualita-
tive essences by possible creatures, consider Castor in Alef. Since Pollux 
has all of Castor’s qualitative properties, there is no qualitative property 
(however complex) the having of which is sufficient for being Castor, and 
hence no qualitative property the having of which is necessary and suf-
ficient for being Castor. (Mutatis mutandis with Pollux.)
Now where do we go from here? This largely depends on what further 
metaphysical implications we take PII’s falsity to have.
Adams seems to take PII’s falsity to imply that “thisness hold[s] a place 
beside suchness as a fundamental feature of reality.”22 It is not entirely clear 
what this means, but I think the following is not unfaithful to Adams. Let 
20Cf. Black, “The Identity of Indiscernibles”; and Adams, “Primitive Thisness and Primi-
tive Identity.”
21For three tactics, see Hacking, “The Identity of Indiscernibles”; O’Leary-Hawthorne, 
“The Bundle Theory of Substance and the Identity of Indiscernibles”; and Hawley, “Identity 
and Indiscernibility.” See Hawley also for general discussion. For a defense of PII in the 
context of defending qualitative singularism, see Zagzebski, “Individual Essence and the 
Creation.”
22Adams, “Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity,” 5 (cf. “Actualism and Thisness,” 3).
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us say that thisness is fundamental just in case it is possible that there are 
some non-qualitative matters that do not consist in any qualitative ones, 
or less elliptically, just in case there are possibly some non-qualitative mat-
ters the instantiation of which (in the case of properties or relations) or 
the holding of which (in the case of propositions) does not consist in the 
instantiation or holding of any qualitative matters. Adams also thinks that 
PII’s falsity implies, or at least suggests, that as a general matter, i.e., pre-
scinding from symmetric worlds like Alef and individuals like Castor and 
Pollux therein, identity properties of individuals are distinct from qualita-
tive properties, though he is unwilling to affirm that, as a general matter, 
they are non-equivalent with them.23
One might be inclined to draw more from PII’s falsity than does Adams. 
For example, Christopher Menzel seems to take PII’s falsity to imply, or at 
least strongly suggest, that virtually no possible contingent being has a 
qualitative essence.24
Menzel’s argument goes roughly as follows.25 For any possible world 
w, let w-minus be a sub-maximal state of affairs that is like w except that it 
omits “spatiotemporal totality facts,” by which I mean facts to the effect 
that w’s spatiotemporally located individuals are all the individuals so lo-
cated. For example, consider a world containing just a cube. The relevant 
sub-maximal state of affairs would omit the fact that the cube is all that 
exists in space and time, and hence may be compossible with, for example, 
the existence of another individual five feet away from the cube. Now for 
any possible world w, we can take there to be an “expanded” possible 
world v that consists of two duplicates (i.e., intrinsic qualitative copies)26 
of w-minus, “appended” in such a way as to result in a counterexample 
to PII. Further, we can suppose that one of v’s “halves” contains w’s indi-
viduals. For example, letting w be a world with a single sphere, v will be a 
two-sphere world containing w’s sphere.
w v
A A B
Finally, for any such counterexample to PII, we can take there to be a “con-
tracted” possible world u that consists of a duplicate of w-minus containing 
the individuals from v’s other half.
23Adams, “Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity,” 13 (cf. “Actualism and Thisness,” 
5).
24See Menzel, “Qualitative Essences and a Final Defense for Plantinga”; and cf. Menzel, 
“Temporal Actualism and Singular Foreknowledge,” 492–493.
25Cf., e.g., Hawthorne, “Causal Structuralism,” 374. Curiously, Menzel attributes the ar-
gument to Adams (“Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity”).
26Cf. Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds, 61–62.
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If we accept this argument, then for virtually any possible world, we 
can get a duplicate possible world containing different individuals. 
(The view that there are duplicate but distinct possible worlds has been 
called haecceitism. Antihaecceitism, by contrast, is the view that there are 
no pairs of worlds that are duplicates and distinct and both possible.27) 
This implies that virtually no possible creature has a qualitative essence. 
For example, take me in the actual world. If there is a duplicate possible 
world that contains a different individual in my “qualitative role,” no 
qualitative properties I have are such that having them is sufficient—and 
hence necessary and sufficient—for being me.
Now let us return to pre-creation divine knowledge. We started by 
considering a version of qualitative singularism on which there is a one-
to-one correspondence between proxies and creatures, the proxies being 
qualitative essences of that for which they proxy.
E1 → Matt
E2 → Obama
E3 → Biden
PII’s falsity undermines this, for it implies that at least some possible 
creatures lack qualitative essences. Now a prima facie natural move, at this 
point, would be to stick with the qualitative theory, stick with the idea 
that proxies are properties possibly had by that for which they proxy, but 
jettison the singularism. This can be done by supposing that proxies are 
properties that, in some cases, fail to constitute essences.28 For example, let 
F be a very specific qualitative property had by Castor in Alef. Despite F’s 
specificity, it fails to constitute an essence of Castor, since Pollux has it too. 
Nevertheless, one might think F can proxy for Castor, i.e., that pre-creation 
acquaintance with F can intuitively constitute knowledge of Castor. Of 
course, if F proxies for Castor, it presumably proxies for Pollux too. Ac-
cordingly, the earlier entertained one-to-one correspondence between 
proxies and creatures breaks down when it comes to Castor and Pollux.
F
Castor
Pollux
27See Skow, “Haecceitism, Anti-haecceitism and Possible Worlds.”
28Cf. Menzel, “Temporal Actualism and Singular Foreknowledge,” 497.
36 Faith and Philosophy
This intuitively results in God’s having, prior to creation, general as op-
posed to singular knowledge of Castor: inasmuch as God’s knowledge 
of Castor is constituted by acquaintance with F, this knowledge seems to 
conflate Castor with another creature, i.e., Pollux.
I defined singularism (in §2) as the view that God’s pre-creation knowl-
edge of creatures is categorically singular, and generalism as the view that 
it is in some cases general. While rendering singularism and generalism 
jointly exhaustive, this also implies that there can be versions of gener-
alism that differ in terms of the extent to which the relevant knowledge is 
general. If we take proxies to be properties possibly had by that for which 
they proxy, we can understand this in terms of the extent to which proxies 
fail to constitute essences. Menzel advocates qualitative generalism,29 and, 
as we have seen, seems to favor a version on which the generality is quite 
pervasive. Adams seems to advocate qualitative generalism,30 and, as we 
have seen, is more agnostic about the extent of generality.
So, if one rejects PII, one might accept some version of qualitative gen-
eralism. Alternatively, one might embrace non-qualitative singularism: 
if God is acquainted, prior to creation, with non-qualitative essences for 
Castor and Pollux, he has singular knowledge of them prior to creation.
I reject both of these responses, and maintain that PII’s falsity is con-
sistent with qualitative singularism. There are two key steps to seeing 
how this is so, which I will elaborate upon in the next two sections respec-
tively. They are closely related, but one can be seen as straightforwardly 
metaphysical, while the other arises when we turn to pre-creation divine 
knowledge itself. As for the metaphysics, PII’s falsity does not imply the 
fundamentality of thisness: even in possible worlds like Alef, we can coher-
ently maintain that all non-qualitative matters consist in qualitative ones. 
As for the theology, we can abandon the idea that proxies are uniformly 
properties possibly had by that for which they proxy. If we give this up, 
we can reject a one-to-one correspondence between proxies and creatures 
(which PII’s falsity does require) without giving up singularism.
5. Metaphysics
We may say something of the form
What it is for it to be that φ is for it to be that ψ,
where the letters “φ” and “ψ” are sentence-variables. Such a claim ex-
presses what we might call a “real definition.”31 Replacing “φ” and “ψ” 
with closed sentences yields a real definition of a proposition, namely that 
expressed by what replaces “φ”. For example: what it is for it to be that 
29Menzel, “Temporal Actualism and Singular Foreknowledge,” 494–495.
30Adams, “Actualism and Thisness,” 9–10. This passage is naturally taken to espouse 
qualitative generalism as opposed to singularism when read in light of Adams’s judgments 
about qualitative essences and the fundamentality of thisness (see, e.g., ibid., 3, 5).
31See Rosen, “Metaphysical Dependence: Grounding and Reduction,” 122–123.
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a city exists is for it to be that . . . . Replacing “φ” and “ψ” with open 
sentences yields a real definition of a property or relation. For example: 
what it is for it to be that x is a city is for it to be that x is . . . (where the 
letter “x” is a variable, not a constant). So claims of real definition express 
real definitions of propositions, in the sense of conveying what it is for 
them to hold, or of properties or relations, in the sense of conveying what 
it is to instantiate them. We can connect talk of real definition with that of 
“consisting in” by saying that, if a matter has a real definition in terms of 
others, the former consists in the latter.
We can ascribe a qualitative essence to something by positing a qualita-
tive real definition for its identity property. For example, consider Matt. 
We can ascribe a qualitative essence to it through a claim of the form
What it is for it to be that x is Matt is for it to be that ψ(x);
where “ψ(x)” is replaced with a qualitative sentence in which the variable 
“x” is free. For example, supposing there are two qualitative properties, 
being F and being G, each of which is essential to Matt, the conjunction 
of which is sufficient for being Matt, the property of being F and G is a 
qualitative essence of Matt. We can say
What it is for it to be that x is Matt is for it to be that x is F and G.
And we could ascribe qualitative essences to Castor and Pollux through 
claims of the form
(*C ) What it is for it to be that x is Castor is for it to be that ψ(x)
(*P) What it is for it to be that x is Pollux is for it to be that ψ(x),
in which “ψ(x)” is replaced with a qualitative sentence in which “x” is free. 
But of course, there are no such truths, since no qualitative property is such 
that having it suffices for being Castor (Pollux).
It might seem to follow that Castor’s and Pollux’s identity properties do 
not consist in qualitative matters. But it does not.
Here is one way to see this. Let us allow a claim of real definition to 
be plural as opposed to singular on the side of the definiendum and/or 
the definiens. For example, this kind of claim is plural on the side of the 
definiendum:
What it is for it to be that φ1 and φ2 is for it to be that ψ.
Now many definiendum-plural real definitions may hold by virtue of a plu-
rality of definiendum-singular ones. For example, one of the form
What it is for it to be that x is human and y is equine is for it to be that 
ψ(x, y)
(the italics emphasizes the plural as opposed to singular-and-conjunctive 
character of the definiendum) might hold by virtue of two real definitions 
of the forms
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What it is for it to be that x is human is for it to be that ψ(x)
What it is for it to be that x is equine is for it to be that ψ(x).
For intuitively, what it is for a pair of entities to be such that one is a human 
and the other a horse just boils down to what it is, on the one hand, for 
something to be a human, and on the other, for something to be a horse.
However, we might think there can be irreducibly (definiendum-)plural 
real definitions, i.e., plural real definitions that do not hold by virtue of a 
plurality of singular ones. Examples might include something in the vi-
cinity of one or more of these:
What it is for it to be that x is a pitcher and y is a catcher is for it to be 
that ψ(x, y)
What it is for it to be that x is a lock and y is a key is for it to be that ψ(x, y)
What it is for it to be that x is an x-axis and y is a y-axis and z is a z-axis 
is for it to be that ψ(x, y, z).32
And, I want to suggest, there may be a plural real definition of the form
What it is for it to be that x is Castor and y is Pollux is for it to be that 
ψ(x, y)
in which the definiens is qualitative. If there is, then inasmuch as there is no 
real definition of the form *C or *P in which the definiens is qualitative, we 
would have an irreducibly plural qualitative real definition of the spheres’ 
identity properties.
The intuitive idea is that, though there is no qualitative property the 
having of which constitutes what it is to be Castor (Pollux), there may be 
a qualitative relation the instantiation of which by two entities constitutes 
what it is for them to be Castor and Pollux. If there is, I think it follows that 
the spheres’ identity properties consist in qualitative matters.33 Though 
the spheres would lack individual qualitative essences, the relevant rela-
tion would constitute what we might call a collective qualitative essence 
for the spheres.34 For specificity, here is an example of what such a real 
definition might look like. Let “F ” be a monadic qualitative predicate sat-
isfied both by Castor and by Pollux in Alef that captures their intrinsic 
qualitative character, and “R” a dyadic qualitative predicate satisfied by 
Castor and Pollux that captures their extrinsic qualitative character. “R” 
comprehends the spheres’ spatial separation, as well as spatiotemporal 
totality facts to the effect that they are alone. Now consider:
32I owe the first two examples to Harold Hodes and Derk Pereboom respectively.
33This line of thought undermines, I think, Rosenkrantz’s argument for haecceities from 
the “problem of individuation” (Haecceity, chap. 2), though I have not directly engaged his 
argument.
34Cf. Fine’s notion of “simultaneous definition” (“Ontological Dependence,” 282–284) or 
“relational essence” (“Senses of Essence,” 65–66).
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(**) What it is for it to be that x is Castor and y is Pollux is for it to be that 
x is F & y is F & x and y are R.
Let Q be the relation constituting the definiens, that is, a relation a pair of 
entities stands in just in case, by definition, they are individually F and 
jointly R. If ** is true, Q’s instantiation by a pair of entities constitutes what 
it is for them to be Castor and Pollux.35
This brings us to Menzel’s argument for the pervasive non-existence 
of qualitative essences for individuals. If sound, this would establish the 
possibility of a duplicate of Alef devoid of Castor and Pollux.
Alef Shmalef
C AP B
And were there such a possible world, ** would be false. For in this other 
world, Q would be instantiated by a pair of entities other than Castor and 
Pollux, in which case Q’s instantiation by a pair of entities would not be 
sufficient for their being Castor and Pollux. And the same would go for 
any qualitative relation. So, Menzel’s argument challenges the existence, 
not only of individual qualitative essences for creatures, but of collective 
qualitative essences for them too.
Since we are granting Alef’s possibility, let us start with that world. 
In the first step of the argument, we infer the possibility of an expanded 
four-sphere world, v, containing Castor and Pollux. In the second step, 
we infer the possibility of a contracted two-sphere world, u (or Shmalef), 
containing v’s other two spheres. However, if we accept **, we should reject 
the first step. Though there may well be a possible duplicate of v, there 
would be no possible duplicate in which two of the spheres are Castor 
and Pollux. For given **, a pair of entities’ standing in Q is necessary for 
their being Castor and Pollux, and Q is not instantiated in v. (Recall that Q 
comprehends totality facts to the effect that there are only two spheres.)36
35I defend the coherence of this sort of irreducibly plural real definition at greater length, 
and in a different context, in my “On the Possibility of Symmetry-breaking Determination” 
(unpublished manuscript). It is important that we not take the relational predicate “R” and 
the relation Q to be satisfied or instantiated by their relata in a certain “order.” (Cf. Fine’s 
notion of a “strictly symmetric” relation [“Neutral Relations,” 17].) For just as no qualitative 
property is such that having it suffices for being Castor (Pollux), no “directed” qualitative 
relation is such that one entity’s “bearing” it “to” another suffices for the first’s being Castor 
(Pollux) and the second Pollux (Castor). The idea behind ** is that two entities’ being indi-
vidually F and jointly R full stop, not in any order, suffices for one’s being Castor (Pollux) and 
the other Pollux (Castor).
36This way of responding to instances of Menzel’s argument is perfectly general, whether 
individual or collective qualitative essences are in the cross-hairs: one can invoke qualitative 
necessary conditions for being a particular creature x (or, for a plurality of entities’ being 
particular creatures x1, x2, etc.) to resist what I have called the “first step” in the argument. 
A referee claims that our ability to resist a Menzel-style attack on individual qualitative es-
sences in this way “would severely restrict the implications of the falsity of PII and make 
the author’s project less urgent.” For “[i]f nearly every possible creature has a qualitative 
40 Faith and Philosophy
I noted in §4 that Menzel’s argument uses PII’s falsity to attack antihaec-
ceitism. There are other ways of doing this too. The following argument 
for haecceitism can basically be found in Adams.37 Recall that, in Alef, 
Castor and Pollux exist for five seconds. Let us expand Alef in the temporal 
dimension by supposing Castor exists for ten seconds instead of five, and 
let us expand Alef again by supposing Pollux does instead. Call these ex-
panded worlds “Bet” and “Gimel.”
Bet Gimel
Alef
C C
C
P P
P
Bet and Gimel are distinct duplicates. So, if possibility is preserved through 
the expansions, they constitute a pair of possible distinct duplicates.
This is a powerful argument for haecceitism. However, unlike Men-
zel’s argument, its soundness would not undermine the view that Castor 
and Pollux have a collective qualitative essence. Alef and Shmalef would 
violate antihaecceitism by virtue of having disjoint domains of indi-
viduals, whereas Bet and Gimel would violate antihaecceitism by virtue 
of distributing qualitative roles across a common domain of individuals 
differently. In the former case, the individuals in either world could not 
have a collective qualitative essence, since any candidate qualitative 
real definiens would be instantiated by different individuals in the other 
world. But in the latter case, there may be a candidate qualitative real 
definiens that is instantiated by the same individuals in both worlds. To be 
sure, if we take Q’s instantiation to imply that the relata exist for exactly 
five seconds, Bet’s and Gimel’s possibility would undermine **. But we 
could modify the definiens by, for example, eliminating some specificity 
so as to render its instantiation consistent with a multiplicity of “possible 
individual essence, then God can just restrict his attention to those.” Now, I noted in §4 that 
there are kinds of generalism that differ as to the extent of generality in God’s knowledge, 
and one might indeed try to defend a rather minimal form, such as by maintaining that only 
PII-violating worlds contain individuals lacking individual qualitative essences. First, how-
ever, I think the notion of a collective qualitative essence is crucial for adequately motivating 
the view that possible creatures tend to have individual qualitative essences. For without this 
notion, it is natural to think that PII-violating worlds contain individuals with irreducibly 
non-qualitative identities. And given the natural thought that the identities of individuals 
in these worlds are not of a radically different sort than those of individuals in other worlds 
(e.g., consider a two-sphere world whose spheres slightly differ in size), it becomes natural 
to extrapolate to possible creatures generally. Second, if my argumentation in §6 is cogent, 
the notion of a collective qualitative essence salvages singularism.
37Adams, “Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity,” 22–23. Cf., e.g., Kment, “Haec-
ceitism, Chance, and Counterfactuals.”
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futures,” resulting in a collective qualitative essence that is instantiated in 
Alef, Bet, and Gimel.
Let us take stock. I have argued that, though PII’s falsity implies the 
possible existence of individuals lacking qualitative essences, it does not 
imply the fundamentality of thisness, for the identity properties of the 
relevant individuals may yet consist in qualitative matters. And one way 
to see this, I have argued, is to see that a collection of individuals each of 
which lacks an individual qualitative essence may together have a collec-
tive qualitative essence. I have also explained how PII’s falsity might be 
taken to indirectly threaten the existence of collective qualitative essences, 
by being used to attack antihaecceitism. And I have argued that, on one 
way of doing so, collective qualitative essences can be used to resist the 
attack itself; and that, on another way, collective qualitative essences are 
not threatened.38
6. Theology
Suppose Castor and Pollux have some sort of collective qualitative es-
sence, and let R be the relevant qualitative relation. And let F be a very 
specific qualitative property shared by Castor and Pollux in Alef. We saw 
earlier that a generalist might take F to constitute a proxy for Castor and 
Pollux. This instantiates the broader approach of taking proxies to be prop-
erties possibly had by that for which they proxy. But let us depart from this 
and take the relation R to constitute a proxy for both Castor and Pollux.
38A referee identifies an apparent tension between Bet’s and Gimel’s possibility and the 
non-fundamentality of thisness. If Bet and Gimel are possible, it seems there are possibly 
non-qualitative propositions that do not consist in qualitative matters. In particular, since 
Bet and Gimel have identical qualitative truths but distinct non-qualitative ones, it seems 
that any non-qualitative proposition over which they differ (e.g., that Castor outlives Pollux) 
could not consist in qualitative truths. More generally, it seems haecceitism implies this-
ness’s fundamentality. Now, I have not argued that thisness is not fundamental per se, but 
that its fundamentality is not implied by PII’s falsity. For there are PII-violating worlds (e.g., 
Alef) all of whose non-qualitative matters can be coherently taken to consist in qualitative 
ones. This is all we need to get the sort of collective qualitative essence on which my present 
defense of qualitative singularism’s consistency with PII’s falsity turns. However, there are 
potential objections to my argument (which there is no space to adequately explore here) 
that turn on the alleged deliverance of thisness’s fundamentality by “Adams-style” candidate 
counterexamples to antihaecceitism (e.g., the pair of Bet and Gimel) (cf. note 42). First, I 
have not granted the genuineness of any such candidate counterexamples per se, but rather 
admitted their prima facie intuitive power and argued that they do not threaten collective 
qualitative essences—unlike “Menzel-style” candidate counterexamples (e.g., the pair of 
Alef and Shmalef), which do. Second, though I am willing to grant that Bet’s and Gimel’s 
possibility would imply thisness’s fundamentality, given §4’s gloss of it, I do not think that 
their possibility would imply that “thisness” constitutes a “fundamental feature of reality” 
in a sense that threatens qualitative singularism. (In my “Qualitativism, Haecceitism, and 
Time” [unpublished manuscript], I discuss this sort of threat to antihaecceitism, as well as 
what it would be for non-qualitative matters to be fundamental, at greater length.) Let me 
just point out here that, if Castor and Pollux have a collective qualitative essence, non-qual-
itative propositions over which Bet and Gimel differ (e.g., that Castor exists for ten seconds) 
will be “ultimately qualitative,” where a proposition p is ultimately qualitative if the identity 
property of any constituent of p by virtue of which p is non-qualitative (e.g., Castor) has a 
qualitative real definition.
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F
Castor
Pollux
R
Castor
Pollux
In so doing, we follow the generalist in rejecting a one-to-one corre-
spondence between proxies and creatures, but—I want to say—without 
embracing generalism. God’s acquaintance with R intuitively constitutes 
singular knowledge of Castor and of Pollux.
I suggested in §2 that whether some pre-creation knowledge constitutes 
general knowledge of a possible creature x can be understood in terms of 
whether that knowledge conflates x with any other possible creature y. 
And I said a prima facie intuitive way of making sense of whether this 
is so is in terms of whether x and y share a proxy. Now I want to refine 
this. If a proxy P for something x is a property possibly had by x, I think 
that, if P is also possibly had by something y that is not x, acquaintance 
with P constitutes general knowledge of x. However, if P is not a property 
possibly had by that for which it proxies, it is by no means clear that P’s 
proxying for multiple creatures suffices for the relevant knowledge’s being 
general. For example, if P is a relation constituting a collective qualitative 
essence, I think acquaintance with it constitutes singular knowledge of all 
the creatures that would instantiate it. In the case of a property proxy, a 
one-many relationship between it and creatures intuitively signifies a lack 
of specificity in the divine knowledge. But in the case of a relation proxy, a 
one-many relationship between it and creatures may be traced to the fact 
that the relevant creatures are essentially connected.
Suppose Matt has a qualitative essence, G. God’s acquaintance with 
G constitutes singular knowledge of Matt, and it seems to me that, by 
the same token, acquaintance with R constitutes singular knowledge of 
Castor and of Pollux. For just as G is such that its instantiation by some-
thing would suffice for that entity’s being a particular creature, namely 
Matt, R is such that its instantiation by two entities would suffice for those 
entities’ being a particular pair of creatures, namely Castor and Pollux. 
The point may be reinforced by juxtaposition. Suppose Alef and Shmalef 
were both possible, such that R failed to constitute a collective qualitative 
essence. In that case, God’s acquaintance with R would fail to constitute 
singular knowledge of any possible creatures, for it would intuitively con-
flate some, such as Alef’s spheres and Shmalef’s spheres.
It might be objected that, even if acquaintance with R does not con-
flate Alef’s spheres with any other pair of possible creatures, it still fails 
to constitute singular knowledge of any possible creatures, by virtue of 
conflating Castor and Pollux themselves. My initial reaction is simply to 
deny the charge. Again, contrast R with F: acquaintance with the latter 
does constitute general knowledge of Castor and of Pollux. And contrast 
the view that R is an essence with the view that it is not: on the latter view, 
acquaintance with R would constitute general knowledge of Castor and 
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of Pollux. However, it may help to consider some other objections that 
may be seen as constituting different ways of advancing this “conflation” 
claim.
It might be said: God’s acquaintance with R does not enable him to 
distinguish Castor and Pollux; so, acquaintance with R does not consti-
tute singular knowledge of them. Call this the direct objection, since the 
premise directly posits a cognitive limitation. But what does the word 
“distinguish” mean in the premise? If we understand the ability to distin-
guish something x and y in terms of the ability to recognize that x and y 
would, were they to exist, be distinct as opposed to identical, two rather 
than one in number, then the premise is false: acquaintance with R does 
enable God to distinguish Castor and Pollux, for in grasping R he grasps 
sufficient conditions for the distinctness of the would-be relata, such as 
their would-be spatial separation. But suppose we understand the ability 
to distinguish something x and y in terms of the ability to grasp some “dis-
tinguishing mark” or “differentia” that x and y respectively essentially 
and impossibly exemplify (or vice versa). This will be a property that x 
and y respectively essentially and impossibly have (or vice versa).
Supposing Alef were actual, there would be no qualitative differentiae 
between Castor and Pollux, i.e., no qualitative property that Castor and 
Pollux respectively essentially and impossibly have (or vice versa). There 
would admittedly be non-qualitative differentiae between them, such as 
being Castor and being Pollux. However, none of these differentiae between 
them would be deep, where by a deep differentia between two entities 
I mean a differentia between them that does not consist in any matters 
that are not differentiae between them. These differentiae would not be 
deep, for their instantiation would consist in that of R. Now if there are 
no deep differentiae between Castor and Pollux to be grasped, and God 
does grasp that in which any differentiae between them consist, I think 
the direct objection fails. Perhaps the inference is bad: if there are no deep 
differentiae between two creatures to grasp, it may be that an inability to 
distinguish them does not imply a lack of singular knowledge. Or perhaps 
the premise is false: if God grasps that in which any differentiae between 
two creatures consists, perhaps he can distinguish them. Recall the basic 
idea behind a proxy account of knowledge: acquaintance with an existent 
entity (a proxy) constitutes knowledge of a non-existent entity (that which 
is proxied). Now it seems that if acquaintance with an essence constitutes 
knowledge of that which would have it, such acquaintance also constitutes 
knowledge of the identity property of that which would have that essence. 
For example, acquaintance with Matt’s qualitative essence G constitutes 
knowledge, not just of Matt, but also of being Matt. So perhaps acquain-
tance with R constitutes knowledge of being Castor and being Pollux, in 
which case God may grasp differentiae between Castor and Pollux. How-
ever we understand the direct objection’s flaw, the fact that it is flawed 
may be reinforced by juxtaposition. Consider a view on which R is not a 
collective essence, on which Castor’s and Pollux’s identity properties are 
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deep differentiae between them, and on which these properties do not 
exist prior to creation. Call this view “generalism*.” On generalism*, God 
is unable to distinguish Castor and Pollux prior to creation in a way that 
does compromise singular knowledge.
It might be said: God’s acquaintance with R does not enable him to 
intentionally create just Castor, or alternatively, just Pollux; so, acquain-
tance with R does not constitute singular knowledge of them. Call this the 
indirect objection, since the premise directly posits a limitation in power, 
which is intuitively supposed to signify a cognitive limitation. I grant the 
premise but deny the inference. Since R constitutes an irreducibly collec-
tive essence of Castor and Pollux, it is impossible for just one of these 
very spheres to exist. For just as anything has an individual essence es-
sentially if at all, anything participates in an irreducibly collective essence 
essentially if at all.39 To be sure, the idea that something is impossible does 
not, in and of itself, imply that God’s inability to bring it about does not 
constitute a lack of power—and hence does not imply that the inability 
does not signify a cognitive limitation. (For example, suppose something 
is impossible partly because God cannot bring it about.) However, since we 
are deriving collective essences from real definitions (cf. §5), the relevant 
impossibility is squarely rooted in the nature of Castor and Pollux,40 and 
so the relevant inability does not signify a cognitive limitation. On gener-
alism*, by contrast, it may be possible for just Castor to exist, and yet God 
is unable to intentionally bring this about. (The most God could do would 
be to intentionally bring it about that such and such a kind of individual 
exists, which could turn out to be Castor.) On this view, God’s inability to 
intentionally create just Castor does signify a lack of singular knowledge.41
Let us take stock. I argued in §5 that, even if Alef is possible and PII 
false, it is coherent that the identity properties of Castor and Pollux would, 
39Suppose Matt and Fred respectively have qualitative essences being G and being H. If 
Matt can co-exist with Fred, we can ascribe them a collective qualitative essence with the 
sentence “what it is for it to be that x is Matt and y is Fred is for it to be that x is G & y is H.” 
But such an essence is not irreducibly collective. And if Matt can exist without Fred, it is not 
essential to Matt that it participates in this collective essence.
40See, e.g., Aquinas, Summa Theologica I, q. 25, art. 3.
41It might be said that, prior to creation, it is not possible that just Castor exists, because, 
prior to creation, there is no such proposition to be possibly true (see, e.g., Adams, “Actualism 
and Thisness,” 10). But this would not be to the point (see Menzel, “Temporal Actualism 
and Singular Foreknowledge,” 499–500). Singularists and generalists can agree that, prior 
to creation, there are no creature-involving propositions to be possibly true, but also that it 
is possible that such propositions come to exist and acquire truth. As far as possibility goes, 
what is relevant is whether it is possible that particular creature-involving propositions come 
to exist and acquire truth. As far as power goes, what is relevant is whether God can do 
things such that, were he to, the existence and truth of particular creature-involving proposi-
tions would necessarily result. If R is a collective essence, acquaintance with it enables God 
to do something, namely actualize its instantiation, such that, were he to, the existence and 
truth of the proposition that (e.g.) Castor exists would necessarily result. It is in this sense 
that, prior to creation, God can intentionally actualize the proposition that Castor exists, 
or intentionally create Castor. On generalism*, by contrast, God cannot intentionally create 
Castor (a fortiori, just Castor) in this sense.
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were they to exist, consist in qualitative matters, and I argued that one 
way of making sense of this is through the idea that the spheres, though 
lacking qualitative individual essences, would participate in a qualitative 
collective essence. In this section, I have defended the conditional claim 
that, if the spheres would indeed participate in such an essence, God’s 
pre-creation acquaintance with it would constitute singular knowledge of 
them. If I am right, PII’s falsity is consistent with qualitative singularism. 
Though debate about the conditional claim could no doubt continue,42 
space is limited, and I think enough has been said to establish, at a 
minimum, its prima facie plausibility. I want to suggest that any intuitive 
resistance to the conditional ultimately boils down either to resistance to 
the antecedent or to a failure to adequately appreciate its significance (or 
both). For intuitively, if the spheres’ identity properties would indeed con-
sist in qualitative matters, acquaintance with some such matters ought to 
suffice for singular knowledge of the spheres. And to be sure, my aim in 
these two sections has not been to argue that the spheres’ identity prop-
erties would in fact consist in qualitative matters, but to argue for the 
coherence of the view that they would (in §5) and to make the connection 
with pre-creation divine knowledge (in this section).
7. Conclusion
I have been working with an account of pre-creation divine knowledge 
of possible creatures on which such knowledge consists in God’s being 
acquainted with proxies or “stand-ins” for creatures, and I have distin-
guished three theories, namely non-qualitative singularism, qualitative 
singularism, and qualitative generalism, which differ in terms of whether 
the proxies are qualitative or non-qualitative, and in terms of whether ac-
quaintance with them constitutes singular or merely general knowledge 
of creatures. In §3, I raised a problem for non-qualitative singularism con-
cerning the pre-creation “availability” of the alleged proxies. In §4, I raised 
a problem for qualitative singularism concerning the apparent falsity of a 
particular version of the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles, and ex-
plained how the problem might seem to motivate qualitative generalism. 
In §5 and §6, I argued that qualitative singularism is consistent with the 
relevant principle’s falsity. The argument turned on two claims: the prin-
ciple’s falsity does not rule out the view that the identity properties of the 
relevant individuals would consist in qualitative matters; and a creature’s 
proxy need not be a property possibly had by it.
Though I think these considerations go some way toward enhancing 
the plausibility of qualitative singularism relative to its competitors, my 
42In particular, it would be fruitful to consider revised versions of the direct and indirect 
objections in which the premises are revised so as to involve, not Castor and Pollux per se, 
but particular Castor- and Pollux-involving states of affairs (such as Bet and Gimel—see §5). 
I also think it would be fruitful to consider objections that turn on distinctively Molinist ideas 
(thanks to a referee here), or more generally, to explore the relationship between Molinism 
and qualitative singularism sans PII.
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main purpose has not been to argue for qualitative singularism per se, but 
to free it from some alleged metaphysical commitments that (in my view) 
have dragged it down. Qualitative singularism stands apart from quali-
tative generalism and non-qualitative singularism in maintaining a firm 
commitment to the metaphysically derivative nature of non-qualitative 
aspects of reality; the latter two theories mainly diverge over whether al-
legedly fundamental non-qualitative matters are divinely graspable prior 
to creation. As such, a full-orbed case for qualitative singularism would 
involve a positive case for the exclusive fundamentality of qualitative 
matters. However, though I have not made that case here, in arguing that 
such a view does not depend on the relevant version of the identity of 
indiscernibles (in §5), I have tried to disarm a major objection to it.43
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